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Three small Florida towns-Hollywood, Dania Beach and
Hallandale Beach-are banding together to rid themselves of
prostitutes. On the table, for the second time in two years, is a
proposal that would declare the cities' resective segments of
Federal Highway "prostitution-free zones." Under the pro-
posed mapping program, repeat offenders are targeted by law
enforcement, arrested, prosecuted, and forced to steer clear of
the so-called zones as a condition of probation. Following the
imposition of such a condition, mere presence in a prostitution-
free zone constitutes a probation violation and warrants imme-
diate arrest.
4
The proposal is not the first of its kind in Florida. In 1995,
Fort Lauderdale was the first to act against prostitutes by creat-
ing SOAP (Stay Out of Areas of Prostitution).! Sarasota fol-
lowed suit in late 1998 with the establishment of "Prostitution
Exclusion Zones."6 The Hollywood-Dania Beach scheme comes
on the heels of Miami Beach's recent action designating eight-
een blocks of South Beach a "hooker-free zone."7
J.D. candidate, Northwestern University School of Law. 2002.
'See Thomas Monnay, Three Towns Want Prostitution Barrier, Afapping Project Would




' Robin Benedick, Lauderdale Wants Soap to Clean Prostitution Zones, SUN-SENTINEL,
Nov. 8, 1995, at lB.
'Tom Spalding, New Zone May Only Relocate Crime, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Dec.
15, 1998, at lB.7James Gordon Meek, Miami Beach Declares Hooker-Free Zone, APBnews.com, Aug. 7,
2000, available at http://www.apbnews.com.html.
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Local officials in Florida claim that prostitution has become
a serious threat to the "family-friendly" environment their cities
seek to promote.8 Proponents of anti-prostitution zones in the
Hollywood-Dania area believe barring prostitutes from the Fed-
eral Highway corridor will draw new businesses to their region.9
This Comment argues that attracting tourism and new in-
dustry, however, should not and cannot be achieved at the ex-
pense of legal rights. This Comment advocates the abolition of
anti-prostitution zones and is presented in four parts. Part I ex-
amines the history of probation and its rehabilitative roots. It
also discusses the philosophical shift away from the traditional
rehabilitative purpose of sentencing, and the recent increase in
the use of probationary conditions as punitive measures by the
courts in sentencing proceedings.
Part II explores the legal challenges confronting anti-
prostitution zones. Such zones violate individual constitutional
rights. Moreover, conditions of probation limiting the geo-
graphic mobility of prostitution offenders are not reasonably re-
lated to the legislative intent of rehabilitation.
Part III analyzes Lisa Ann Dietz's recent challenge to Sara-
sota's "Prostitution Exclusion Zone" and the inadequacy of the
opinion issued by Sarasota's Twelfth Judicial Circuit in response
to that challenge.
Finally, Part IV discusses the degree to which communities
ignore the rehabilitative ideal when it comes to prostitution, as
evidenced by the extraordinary resources they divert to combat
and punish prostitutes. Unwilling to pay heed to feminist ar-
guments decrying the criminalization of prostitution, such
communities ultimately must reallocate resources for rehabilita-
tion.
I. THE ROOTS AND EVOLUTION OF PROBATION: AN OUTGROWTH
OF THE REHABILTATIVE IDEAL
In 1878, Massachusetts became the first state to enact a pro-
bation statute.'0 Today, all fifty states," and the federal govern-
8k1&
'See Monnay, supra note 1, at lB.
10 See U.S. v. Stine, 646 F.2d 839, 841 (3d Cir. 1981); Frank W. Grinnell, The Corn-
mon Law History of Probation, in POLICE, PRISON, AND PUNISHMENT 303, 316 (Kermit L.
Hall ed., 1987).
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ment,12 have probation statutes of their own. Courts possess no
inherent authority to place individuals on probation. Their
authority is derived solely from statutes.'"
Because probation is a statutory device, discerning the pur-
poses of probation requires an examination of the legislative in-
tent behind the statutes themselves. This is the task with which
appellate courts across the country are faced when deciding
whether to uphold conditions of probation. Thus, how a court
characterizes the purpose of its state's probation statute is of
paramount importance to the offender who stands before it.
Historically, courts used probation to fulfill the dual pur-
poses of (1) offender rehabilitation and (2) protection of the
community from future criminal conduct.' 4 An examination of
the historical roots of probation lends support to this interpre-
tation. Probation's history, encompassing both its antecedents
in English common law as well as its origins in the United
States, exposes an institution preoccupied with the notion of of-
fender rehabilitation and individualized justce.'5
In early English common lawjudqes employed a number of
practices including "benefit of clergy," 6 "judicial reprieve," 7 and
"recognizance."' 8 These equitable principles were the forerun-
" NEIL P. COHEN &JAMES GOBERT, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE § 1.02, at 7
(1983).
12 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-56 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
's See COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 11, § 2.03, at 34. But see TEX. Co,,sT. art IV, §
lla (authorizing courts to grant probation).
' See Michael George Smith, The Propriety and Usefulness of Geographical Restrictzons
Imposed as Conditions ofProbation, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 571, 574 (1995).
's See Sharon M. Bunzel, The Probation Officer and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Strange Philosophical Bedfellows, 104 YALE L.J. 933, 936 (1994).
6 Operating under the theory that only church courts enjoyed jurisdiction over
ecclesiastics, the benefit of clergy exempted ecclesiastics from the King's criminal
courts. Id.at 936 n.9 (citing LEONAC. GABEL, BENEMoF OCLERGY LNTHELTERMMDLE
AGES (Smith College Studies in History, Vol. 14, Nos. 1-4, Oct. 1928-July 1929).
'7 Bunzel, supra note 15, at 936 n.10 (citing CHARLEs LIONEL CHUTE & MARJORIE
BELL, CRImE, COuRTS AND PROBATION 16 (1956) ("Through judicial reprieve, a judge
temporarily suspended either the imposition or execution of a criminal sentence.
This practice allowed judges to modify the severity of the law in individual cases at
their discretion. Judicial reprieve was a precursor to the practice of suspension of
sentence, which was brought to the colonies from England, and remained in effect
until the enactment of probation laws."))
18 Bunzel, supra note 15, at 936 n.11 (citing United Nations, Dep't of Social Affairs,
The Legal Origins of Probation, excepted in PROBATION, PAROLE AND CoMMUN YT
CORREC'IONS 81, 82 (Robert M. Carter & Leslie T. Wilkins eds., 2d ed. 1976)) (noting
that recognizance, developed in fourteenth century England, allowed a defendant
20011 1103
SANDRA L. MOSER
ners of probation, affording judges wide latitude and discretion
in their dealings with individual offenders.
Probation is a manifestation of the penal philosophy of re-
habilitation. The rehabilitative ideal embodies the notion that
the primary function of the penal system is to change not only
convicted offenders' behavior, but their outlook and character,
as well. '9 In doing so, society is able to promote offenders' in-
terests and its own defense against unwanted conduct at the
same time.2" Stated more simply, rehabilitation is "the opposite
of punishment.
21
Perhaps the most significant and most prevalent expressions
of this rehabilitative ideal in the United States was the materiali-
zation of indeterminate sentencing.22 Emerging in 1870,23 the
notion of indeterminate sentencing reflected the historic and
"almost infinite" power ofjudges to exercise discretion in devis-
ing individual sentences. Under the concept, the sentence the
court imposed upon the offender at conviction did not deter-
mine the true length of his sentence. Rather, the offender's
progress toward rehabilitation during incarceration controlled,
and judges were empowered to adjust sentences accordingly. 2
By the early twentieth century, rehabilitative reformers, who be-
lieved that determinate sentencing was antithetical to the reha-
bilitative ideal, succeeded in establishing the concept of
indeterminate sentencing as the norm in the United States.
Essential to the concept of indeterminate sentencing was
judicial discretion. And, this discretion was to be used to serve
the rehabilitative ideal. Indeterminate sentencing and the ac-
convicted of a minor offense to "make assurances to the public" of his good future
behavior).
" NEIL COHEN, 1 THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PA4 OLE § 7:3, at7-7 (2d ed. 2000).
20FRANCiS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OFTHE REHABLITATIVE IDEAL 2 (1981).
" See Bunzel, supra note 15, at 937 (quoting Willard Gaylin & David Rothman, In-
troduction to ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOINGJUsTIcE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS Xxix
(1976)).
22 Marvin Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 29 (1972).
"Marvin Zalman, The Rise and Fall of Indeterminate Sentencing, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 45,
48 (1977).
"' Charles J, Ogeltree, The Death of Discretion: Reflections on the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1941 (1988).
2 See id.
2See Bunzel, supra note 15, at 937 n.18 (citing as authority MODEL PENAL CODE §§
6.06, 4.02(1) (a) (1962) (mandating that all felony convicts receive indeterminate




companying judicial discretion, however, were only one expres-
sion of the rehabilitative ideal. It was out of this same ideal that
probation emerged and grew.2 Indeed, a "quest for rehabilita-
tion of offenders and a focus on individualized sentences
formed the core of the probation movement in America."2
In 1841, John Augustus, known as the "Father of Proba-
tion," introduced America to the formal concept of probation.9
During that year, Augustus encountered a man about to be sen-
tenced and finding the man "not yet past all hope of reforma-
tion," bailed him out and procured the man a reduced
sentence.s Over the next eighteen years, in lieu of incarcera-
tion, judges released over two thousand offenders to Augustus'
custody.
3
In 1880, two years after statutorily enacting the nation's first
probation law, the Massachusetts legislature approved the na-
tion's first law directing states to hire probation officers. 2 The
law stated that officers must "carefully inquire into the character
and offence of every person arrested for crime ... with a view to
ascertaining whether the accused may reasonably.be expected
to reform without punishment."" To function effectively, the
rehabilitation model of the early twentieth century required
both probation officers and sentencing judges to acquire de-
tailed information about offenders. This information was then
used to structure individualized sentences.Y As the Supreme
Court noted in Williams v. New York, "Highly relevant-if not es-
sential-to selection of an appropriate sentence is the posses-
sion of the fullest information Rossible concerning the
defendant's life and characteristics." The Williams Court no
27 See Bunzel, supra note 15, at 938.
IL
See CoHEN, supra note 19, §§ 1:2-1:4, at 1-17.
See Bunzel, supra note 15, at 938 (quotingJOHN AUGUSTUS, A Report of the Labors of
John Augustu= for the Last Ten Years, in AID OF TIE UNFORTUNATE 5 (Boston, Wright &
Hasty 1852), reprinted asJOHN AUGUSTUS, FIRsT PROBATION OFnCER (Nat'l Probation
Ass'n 1939)).
3' SeeBunzel, supra note 15, at 938 n.27 (citing DEAN CHAMPION, FELON PROBATION
2 (1988)).
32 Bunzel, supra note 15, at 934.
I& at 939 n.29 (citing the Act of Mar. 22, 1880, ch. 129, 1880 Mass. Acts 87).
Id. at 940.
337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
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longer recognized retribution as "the dominant objective of the
criminal law."''
The rehabilitation model upon which the probation move-
ment was based began to undergo attacks beginning in the late
1970s and continuing on into the 1980s.37 Contributing to the
backlash was the publication of social science studies that con-
cluded incarceration did nothing to rehabilitate offenders. Ad-
ditional factors included the growing public perception that the
rehabilitative ideal was too lenient, and a massive increase in the
crime rate.m Increased support for a model of punishment
based on retribution and incapacitation emerged. The influ-
ences of such a model are evident in recent American history.
Since Williams, the United States commenced what now seems a
relentless "War on Drugs," imposed huge increases in prison
terms through the use of the "three-strikes" laws, and ap-
proached capital punishment with newfound gusto.3 9 In short,
retribution has been resurrected as the dominant objective of
criminal law with respect to incarcerated offenders while
"[t] herapy, reform and rehabilitation [of the incarcerated] have
fallen into discredit and disrepute."
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,'41 mandating the re-
placement of previously judge-determined, individualized sen-
tences with sentences uniform and proportional in nature,
directly reflects this outlook.42 Congress ordered the Commis-
sion on Sentencing to ensure that the Federal sentencing prac-
tices and policies carry out the "four purposes of sentencing":
rehabilitation, retribution, incapacitation and deterrence.4' The
result was the effective eradication of the very concept of inde-
terminate sentencing." Notwithstanding the introduction of
uniformity in sentencing, and the resultant usurpation of judi-
61Id. at 248.
" See Bunzel, supra note 15, at 946-47.
"Symposium, The Future of Punishment, 46 UCLA L REV. 1719, 1721-23 (1999).
"Id at 1720.
4,18 U.S.C.A. § 3551 (1984).
"Frank 0. Bowman, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear ofJudging and the State of the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LouIs U. LJ. 299, 335 (2000).
"S. REP. No. 98-225, at 161, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. 3182, 3344.
"See Bunzel, supra note 15, at 937 n.18 (citing as an example CAL PENAL CODE §§
1168, 3020 (West 1970) (amended in 1984 to replace indeterminate sentencing sys-
tem with determinate one)).
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cial discretion, Congress still instructed sentencing judges to
"consider" all four goals before imposing a particular sentence.4
Rehabilitation and retribution, however, are fundamentally in-
46consistent concepts. Determinate sentencing is just as anti-
thetical to the rehabilitative ideal today as it was during the early
twentieth century. Ultimately, promotion of one purpose at
the expense of the other becomes inevitable.48 Notwithstanding
Congress' assertions to the contrary, the Guidelines do not as-
sign equal weight to the four sentencing goals. Evident in the
Sentencing Reform Act, in its legislative history and in the
Guidelines themselves, is a preference for just desserts and a dis-
favored view of rehabilitation. 49 The Senate itself even acknowl-
edged that, "in light of current knowledge... 'imprisonment is
not an appropriate means of promoting correction and reha-
bilitation.'" 0 Rather, it is a means of effecting punishment. For
the incarcerated, then, rehabilitation was out, and retribution
was in.
Probation, as a manifestation of the rehabilitative ideal, has
also undergone erosion. Not to the point of "discredit and dis-
repute" that currently characterizes the idea of rehabilitating an
incarcerated offender, however. The retributivist notions of the
1970s and 1980s led to an inevitable population explosion in
our prison systems. 5' Likewise, the probation population has
also grown by an average of three percent every year since
1990. This growth, and the burgeoning caseload accompany-
ing it, has become increasingly difficult for correction agencies
to handle.5 A 1985 study for the National Institute of Justice
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2) (1988) (purposes encompass rehabilitation, deterrence,
incapacitation and retribution).
SSeeBunzel, supra note 15, at 951 n.103 (citing Robinson, infra note 48, at 20).
471da
' See Paul H. Robinson, Hybrid Principle for the Distribution of Criminal Sanctions. 82
Nw. U. L REv. 19, 20 (1987).
41 See Bunzel, supra note 15, at 951.
S. REP'. No. 98-225, supra note 43, at 76 (quoting proposed 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (a)).
5 In 1970, there were less than 200,000 inmates in state and federal prison systems
combined. As ofJune 30, 1998, that figure had risen to 1,277,866. This rise is in the
face of a decrease in the levels of both property and violent crime. Id.
12 Deelopments in the Law--AltMnatves to Incarceration, 111 HARV. L REV. 1863, 1946
n.9 (1998) (citing THOmAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DFP'T OF JUSTICE, CHARACTERISTICS OF
ADULTS ON PROBATION, 1995 at 1 (1997)).
Id. at 1946 n.10 (citing RANDALL GUENEs, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DIFRFCULT
CLIENTS, LARGE CASELOADS PLAGUE PROBATION, PAROLE AGENCIES 4 (1988)).
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concluded that the criminal justice system needed an "interme-
diate form of punishment for those offenders who are too anti-
social for the relative freedom that probation now offers, but
not so seriously criminal as to require imprisonment."-" Courts
and legislatures have responded to these mounting difficulties
by creating sentencing alternatives. Theoretically, these alterna-
tives are tailored to meet the needs of individual offenders, and
often take the form of probation conditions.55 Historically, the
use of individualized sentencing served as an expression of the
rehabilitative ideal, rather than "an intermediate form of pun-
ishment.
56
Typically, a court will grant probation subject to a list of
standard conditions. 7 The court may then go on to impose ad-
ditional conditions pursuant to a clause nearly ubiquitous in
federal58 and state probation statutes.5 9 Exercising their statu-
tory discretion, judges all over the United States selectively im-
pose conditions of probation on nonviolent offendersW
Arguably, the escalating use of such conditions signals an un-
willingness to abandon probation's traditional rehabilitative
ideal. There are cases where courts do impose these inventive
sentences in an individualized manner, adhering to the tradi-
tional rehabilitative ideal.6' Examples of such probation condi-
" Id. at 1946 n.12 (citing JOAN PETERSILIA ET AL, GRANTING FELONS PROBATION:
PUBLICRISKS AND ALTERNATrVEs ix (1985)).
s Id. at 1947 n.20.
Id. at 1946.
57 See, e.g., FL.A. STAT. ch. 948.03 (2000). Florida's statute provides a list of proba-
tion conditions that need not be orally announced at sentencing-and are thus con-
sidered standard-including regular meetings with probation officers and a
prohibition on carrying a firearm.
"' See Developments in the Law-Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 52, at 1947
n.22 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553 (a), 3563 (b) (1994)).
"' See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 948.03 (6) (2000) ("The enumeration of specific kinds of
terms and conditions shall not prevent the court from adding thereto such other or
others as it considers proper.").
o See Developments in the Law-Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 52, at 1949
n.41 (citing Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L.
REv. 1880, 1882 (1991)).
61 See infra notes 62-64.
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tions include psychiatric treatment," alcohol rehabilitation,6
and community service.6
Too many courts, however, welcome the discretion but ig-
nore the rehabilitative goal of probation.6 In response to the
public's disappointment with traditional punishments and over-
crowded prisons, some judges have gone to new lengths to
make the punishment fit the crime.6 Probation, however, has
never been about punishment.67 Assuming judges find them-
selves constrained by the tension between punitive and rehabili-
tative measures, awkvard attempts to characterize punitive
probation conditions as "rehabilitative" must fail. Statutess, ju-
dicial opinions6 and the origins of probation itself' recognize
rehabilitation as the primary goal of probation. In exercising
the discretion afforded them by open-ended probation statutes,
courts must adhere to the rehabilitative ideal embodied by pro-
bation.
I. LEGAL CHALLENGES
Probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which
every citizen is entitled. They enjoy, instead, a conditional lib-
erty dependent on the observance of special probation restric-
SeePeople v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Ill. 1997).
SeePeople v. Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d 146, 147 (N.Y. 1995).
64 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. 40-35-303 (d) (3) (1997) (allowing courts to require
community service of offenders).
SeeJon A. Brilliant, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter A Critical Analysis of Modern Pro-
bation Conditions, 1989 DUKE .J 1357, 1369 (1989).
Id. at 1369-70.
See COHEN, supra note 19, § 7:4, at 7-8.
See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-303(A) (1989) ("assist the defendant in leading a
law-abiding life"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53A-30(A)(9) (West 1989) ("any condi-
tions reasonably related to his rehabilitation"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 17A § 31-20-
6(F) (1989) ("reasonably related to ... rehabilitation"); Devdopments in the Lau--Al-
ternatives to Incarceration, supra note 52, at 1956 n.114 (quoting FLA. STAT. ch.
921.187(1) (1997) (permitting judges to impose conditions so as "to best serve the
needs of society... and to provide the opportunity for rehabilitation," and IowA
CODE ANN § 907.7 (1987) ("The purposes of probation are to provide the maximum
opportunity for the rehabilitation of the defendant")).
' See, e.g., Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1980) ("primary
pur.gose of probation is to rehabilitate the offender").
See generally Bunzel, supra note 15 (arguing that the practice of probation in
America grew out of a quest to rehabilitate offenders).
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tions.7' Judges are often afforded wide latitude in imposing
these restrictions or conditions. 2 Regardless of these limitations
upon liberty, convicted offenders continue to launch an array of
legal challenges to the use of judge-made probation condi-
tions.73
Historically, probation conditions have managed to escape
constitutional scrutiny in one of two ways. First, under an "act
of grace" theory, probation is the more lenient alternative to in-
carceration and thus, probationers will not be heard to com-
plain about a voluntary act of clemency by the court.74 In 1973,
however, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected this theory.
Second, under the "contract" or "covenant" theory, courts rea-
son that the offender waives constitutional rights in exchange
for exemption from incarceration. In passing the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, however, Congress declared that probation
was a sentence in and of itself, effectively rejecting both the
"contract" and "act of grace" theories." Nevertheless, courts
continue to rely upon both theories.78 Their reliance makes it
difficult for offenders to argue that invalid probation conditions
violate individual constitutional rights." Well-founded argu-
ments do exist, however, and must be asserted to prevent courts
from imposing probation conditions that do not pass constitu-
tional muster.
7' See Rowe v. Lamb, 130 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 1997), reh'g denied, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 713 (1998).
72 See United States v. Chapel, 428 F.2d 472, 474 (9th Cir. 1970) (explaining that
judges are granted broad discretion when imposing probation conditions); State v.
Morgan, 389 So. 2d 364 (La. 1980) (holding that trial judge enjoys wide latitude in
imposing conditions including banishment from French Quarter); State v. Giraud,
412 P.2d 104, 105 (Wash. 1966) (sentencing judge has total discretion to grant or
withhold probation).
See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
74 Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 COLuM. L. REv. 181, 188-91
(1967).
7' See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.4 (1973).
76 See United States v. Ross, 9 F.3d 1182, 1191 (7th Cir. 1993); Judicial Review of Pro-
bation Conditions, supra note 74, 191-93.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-59, 3561-66, 3571-74, 3581-86 (1994).
7' See, e.g., Ross, 9 F.3d at 1191 (relying on contract theory of probation); State v.
Kohlman, 854 P.2d 318, 319 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993) (relying on the act of grace theory
of probation).
7' Id.
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There are two strains of legal challenges confronting anti-
prostitution zones: one, arguments that such zones violate indi-
vidual constitutional rights; two, probation conditions limiting
the geographic mobility of prostitution offenders are not rea-
sonably related to the purposes of criminal sentencing. The
zones do not withstand either challenge. First, compelling of-
fenders to stay out of anti-prostitution zones is de facto banish-
ment. As such, the statutes unconstitutionally preempt both the
individual's and the community's rights to freedom both of
speech and association. Second, current state and federal stat-
utes, as well as case law, stress that conditions of probation that
do not serve rehabilitative ends are beyond the scope ofjudicial
authority.so Probationary conditions forcing prostitution of-
fenders to stay out of designated zones fail to fulfill the tradi-
tional purposes of probation. Despite the philosophical decline
of the rehabilitative ideal in recent decades with respect to in-
carceration, it is this goal by which to measure anti-prostitution
zones and conditions of probation.
A. ANTI-PROSTITUTION ZONES CANNOT WITHSTAND INDIVIDUAL
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS CHALLENGES
Florida's anti-prostitution zones violate a probationer's indi-
vidual constitutional rights. Compelling offenders to stay out of
designated zones is de facto banishment, albeit intrastate, and
implicates an offender's right to freedom of association guaran-
teed by the constitutional right to speech, and to petition the
government and assemble peacefully under the First Amend-
ment.81
SeeState v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410, 411 (S.C. 1985) (judges are granted wide, but
not unlimited, discretion when imposing conditions of probation and they cannot
impose conditions that are illegal and void as against public policy); People v. Keller,
143 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (court's discretion to impose conditions of
probation is constrained not only by terms of the statute granting the court that
authority, but by constitutional safeguards); supra notes 34 and 35.
81 U.S. CONST. amend. I. Other arguments have been posited against the use of
banishment-e.g., banishment constitutes a form of cruel and unusual punishment,
see People v. 0., 321 N.Y.S.2d 518 (N.Y. 1971), it violates one's right to travel, see United
States v. Tortora, 994 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1993), and it violates the Supremacy Clause, see
State v. Camargo, 537 P.2d 920 (Ariz. 1975). An in-depth discussion of these claims is
beyond the scope of this article.
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At least fifteen states have express constitutional provisions
barring banishment of individuals from their state.12 Absent such
an express provision, some courts are forced to rely upon public
policy considerations to strike down sentences incorporating
provisions that banish offenders from a particular state.
Whether relying upon constitutional authority or considerations
grounded in public policy, the vast majority of both federal and
state courts support the proposition that interstate banishment
is per se illegal. These courts do little, however, to fully ex-
plain the rationale behind their decisions. Courts frequently
cite both People v. Baum" and Dear WingJung v. United State 6 in
support of finding interstate banishment per se illegal. Neither
decision, it has been argued, provides adequate constitutional
analysis preceding the rejection of banishment as unlawful."7
Despite the lack of in-depth analysis, the rules of both cases
have been followed by the majority of courts, and banishment
(from the state or nation) has been summarily struck down as
illegal."'
In contrast, decisions regarding the use of intrastate ban-
ishment-the issue implicated by anti-prostitution zones-are
not characterized by such a high degree of uniformity.89 Not
surprisingly, such decisions are similar to those concerning in-
terstate banishment in that they fail to provide a sufficient dis-
cussion of the issues.
812 SeeALA. CoNST. art.1, § 30; ARK. CONsT. arL2, § 21; GA. CONST. art.l, § 1, para.
21; ILL. CONST. art.1, § 11; KAN. CoNsT. § 12 (amended 1972); MD. CONST. art. XXIV;
MASS. CONST. partl, art. XII; NEB. CONsT. art.1, § 15; NH. CONST. partl, art. XIV; N.C.
CONST. art.1, § 19; OHio CoNsr. art.1, § 12; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 29; TENN. CONST.
art. 1, § 8; TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 20; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. XXI; W. VA. CONST. art. III, §
5.
83 See, e.g., Minnesota ex rel Halverson v. Young, 154 N.W.2d 699 (1967) (finding
banishment as a probation condition contrary to the underlying policy of the proba-
tion law, which is to rehabilitate offenders without compromising public safety).
84 William Garth Snider, Banishment: The History of Its Use and a Proposal for Its Aboli-
tion Under the First Amendment, 24 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONINEMENT 455, 466
n.77 (1998).
"251 Mich. 187 (Mich. 1930).
312 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1962).
17 See Snider, supra note 84, at 468.
Id. at 467.
Compare In Re White, 97 Cal. App. 3d 141 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (probationary
condition prohibiting defendant from entering specified areas of the city unreason-
able and unconstitutional), with State v. Morgan, 389 So. 2d 364, 364 (La. 1980) (up-
holding defendant's banishment from the French Quarter).
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Notwithstanding the courts' lack of analysis and consensus,
intrastate banishment violates an individual's constitutional
rights. Banishment from a geographical area unconstitutionally
deprives individuals of the means and the right to affect the po-
litical process.90 Intrastate banishment comes in a variety of
shapes and sizes. It can range from banishing someone from a
designated area within a county, like one of Florida's mapped
anti-prostitution zones, to banishing someone from all but one
county in the state.9' Though the means of implementation
vary, the purpose underlying all forms of banishment is to re-
move an individual from a particular geographic area. This re-
moval, however, impermissibly interferes with citizens' rights to
associate for a political purpose.2 The speech that flows from
such association is "indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth."93 And it is this brand of speech that the Su-
preme Court said the "framers of the Bill of Rights were most
anxious to protect."9
Again, probationers do not enjoy absolute liberty.5U Condi-
tions of probation are, with some standard exceptions, discre-
tionary. Consequently, it is not uncommon for probationary
sentences to contain language prohibiting released offenders
from associating with known criminals.' It is not difficult to
discern the legitimate penological purpose of such a condition.
Furthermore, this condition is sufficiently tailored to meet such
a purpose. This sort of non-association condition targets a spe-
cific subgroup of individuals: It does not function to banish one
from all associations within an entire geographic area. Anti-
prostitution zones do function to bar convicted prostitutes from
all associations within a designated region. Regardless of
See Snider, supra note 84, at 495.
91 See State v. Collett, 208 S.E.2d 472, 474 (Ga. 1974).
"2 See generally United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562 (1981) (acknowledging that
condition of probation barring defendants from going within 250 feet of military base
interfered with defendants' exercise of First Amendment rights, both of free speech
and of association).
"' See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984) (quoting Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)).
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 383.
See supra note 71.
SeeMassaro, supra note 60.
See, e.g., United States v. Adderly, 529 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1976) (upholding pro-




whether the region is known as a hotbed of sexual solicitation,
the banned associations may be considered political in nature.
Consequently, these associations deserve constitutional protec-
tion.
One commentator, Garth Snider, urges that all crimes are
political in nature:98
When the political state power expresses its ideology, or value system,
through the regulations of the criminal code, it determines the 'norms
of action' (norma agendi) and, at the same time, authorizes the executive
organs of the state to apply penal sanctions in order to enforce the ob-
servance of these norms or, in other words, the acceptance of the value
99
system.
In short, Snider argues, criminal codes that mandate and
sanction the prosecution of prostitutes are merely a manifesta-
tion of lawmakers' moral codes.'00 Accordingly, no matter how
marginal the crime, questioning the prohibition of the act is a
manner of political protest.' ' Snider offers sodomy as an ex-
ample. According to Snider, the issue of sodomy itself is inher-
ently political because a select group of individuals,
.homosexuals, are singled out most frequently under the laws
forbidding it. 02 Under this analysis, "the perpetrator of an act
of sodomy could rightly be considered a political criminal."'0 3
The same is true for women targeted by prostitution laws.
Although the statutes prohibiting prostitution are gender-
neutral, women are disparately impacted by the enforcement of
such statutes.t 4 Despite the fact that there are almost as many
males who engage in prostitution as there are females, '05 women
account for ninety percent of prostitution arrests.' 6 Moreover,
women cannot engage in prostitution at all without a customer,
the "john." In some states, statutes have no provisions relating
,See Snider, supra note 84, at 499-507.
Id at 500 (quoting STEPHEN SCHAFER, THE PoLrncAL CRIMINAL: THE PROBLEM OF
MORAn AND CRIME 21 (1974)).
"0 See Snider, supra note 84, at 500-01.
101 Id
" Id (quoting SCHAFER, supra note 99, at 21).
1O3 Id
'o' See infra note 107.
" R. BARRI FLOwERS, THE VICIMIZATION AND EXPLOrrATION OF WOMEN AND
CHILDREN 173 (1994).
"6 Deborah L Rhode, Who is the Criminal, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 25, 1995, at A22.
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to the punishment of those who patronize prostitutes. '07 Arrest,
prosecution and conviction are reserved only for prostitution,
not solicitation.' s Even the Model Penal Code ("MPC") exem-
plifies this inequality. The MPC would punish both female
prostitutes and their customers, but the penalties for prostitutes
are harsher.1J 9 According to a recent Boston study, 263 women
were arraigned in Boston on prostitution charges in 1990."',
Notwithstanding the law's equal application to both prostitutes
and their customers, incredibly, there was not a single customer
arraigned in Boston courts that year."' Like the homosexuals in
Snider's example, women are targeted for enforcement.
Alone, this singling out of women arguably politicizes pros-
titution. The characterization of prostitution by some women as
freedom of choice, however, increases the politicization of pros-
titution. Despite the general agreement among feminists that
prostitution should be decriminalized, the debate over legaliza-
tion persists.112  Speaking at a symposium entitled "Economic
Justice for Sex Workers," activist Norma Jean Almodovar stated,
"the current enforcement of prostitution laws goes well beyond
any justifiable prevention of inappropriate public activity which
would concern society." "s At issue for Almodovar is the codifi-
cation of a set of values and preferences that obviate a woman's
right to do with her body what she chooses."' Among feminists,
there is an emerging understanding that laws against prostitu-
tion prevent women from determining their own sexuality."5
The vigorous objection to the criminalization of prostitution
17Julie Lefler, Comment, Shining the Spotlight on Johns: Moving Toward Equal Treat-
ment of Male Customers and Female Prostitutes, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. 11, 17 (1999).
'9 SeeMODEL PENAL CODE § 251.2 (1995).
"o Minouche Kandel, Whores in Court Judicial Processing of Prostitutes in the Boston
Municipal Court in 1990, 4YALEJ.L. & FuEmIsu 329, 333 (1992).
111 Id.
112 See Kate DeCou, U.S. Social Policy on Prostitution: Whose Welfare is Seried?, 24 NEW
ENG.J. ON CRM. & Crv. CoNFmENr 427, 451 (1998). The American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) and the National Organization for Women (NOW) have both for-
mally endorsed decriminalization. See id.
" SeeNormaJean Almodovar, ForTheir Own Good: The Role of the Prostitution Laws as
Enforced by Cops, Politicians and Judges, 10 HASTINGS WoMN'S L.J. 119, 128 (1999).
114 See id.
11 Priscilla Alexander, Prostitution: A Difficult Issue for Feminists, in SEX Woams




only strengthens the characterization of female prostitution of-
fenders as political criminals. As political criminals who are
barred from entering anti-prostitution zones, offenders are be-
ing denied their constitutional right to associate, to protest the
criminalization of the exchange of money for sexual acts they
choose to perform.1
7
Besides implicating the constitutional right of freedom of
association, banishment fails to posit a realistic solution to the
problems of crime. Relocation, rather than rehabilitation, of
the offender is realized. The dumping of one community's
criminals onto another is at the heart of state constitutional
provisions forbidding the banishment of offenders. 18 Such a
policy merely removes the criminal element and the attendant
source of crime from one community and forces it upon an-
other." 9 An Alaska case striking down a condition of probation
requiring a drug dealer to stay out of a specified 45-block area
highlights the problem.2 ° The Alaska Court of Appeals took ju-
dicial notice that drug sales could be made anywhere in the
city.' Consequently, the court reasoned, it was irrelevant that
the prescribed area was characterized by significant drug activ-
ity.
Like the sale of narcotics, the selling of sex is not location-
specific. Florida cities have mapped out areas that are heavily
concentrated with streetwalkers. Barring a prostitute from such
a designated area, however, does nothing to further her reha-
116 Prostitutes voluntarily engaging in the exchange of money for sex are political
objectors to the codification of moral opposition to such an exchange.
117 In no way does this argument seek to gloss over the uglier aspects of prostitution
or to ignore the fact that there are women forced into the trade, and women forced
by pimps or simple economics to remain in the trade. The criminalization of pimp-
ing and pandering in this country, however, makes no distinction between a coercive
relationship and one that is voluntary. SeeAlexander, supra note 115, at 196-97. Nor
does this argument assert that every woman who has prostituted herself has done so
with a political purpose. Rather, it is an acknowledgement of the desire on the part
of some prostitutes to exercise the right to choose for themselves what they will do
with their bodies.
' See People v. Baum, 251 Mich. 187, 188 (Mich. 1930) (stating that banishment
would allow one state to dump its criminals on another state); COHEN, supra note 19,
§ 10:10, at 10-18 (dumping may tend to cause tension among varying jurisdictions
and possibly invite retaliation).
"' See Snider, supra note 84, at 458.




bilitation and certainly does not prevent her from continuing to
accept solicitations. One Sarasota prostitute explained to a re-
porter that being barred from a zone might hurt business tem-
porarily, but she knows she can find customers along North
Washington Boulevard, an area that was not mapped for exclu-
sion.'2 Even Sarasota Police Sgt. J.W. Carr acknowledged that
"[c]rime is nothing but displacement."'o The displacement and
relocation of prostitution offenders resulting from banishment
belies the rehabilitative goal of probation and thereby subverts
the purposes of criminal sentencing to which judges must ad-
here.
B. "REASONABLE RELATION"
Probation conditions limiting the geographic mobility of
convicted prostitutes are not reasonably related to the purposes
of probation statutes. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines man-
date that a probation condition must be reasonably related to
the purposes of sentencing. Furthermore, such a condition may
"only involve such deprivations of liberty or property as are rea-
sonably necessary to effect the purposes of sentencing."' 4 Fed-
eral courts must adhere to this standard.' = Most state courts
abide, depending upon the avowed "purposes of sentencing"
designated by a state.'2 Whether one looks to the legislature or
judiciary, it is evident that rehabilitation must be the primary
goal of probation'2
Present state and federal statutes stress that non-
rehabilitative conditions of probation are beyond the scope of
judicial authority.'28 Florida courts are among those directed by
"2 See Spalding, supra note 6 ("They'll have certain zones. 1['Il] have to work be-
yond that zone.").
123 id.
'24 18 U.S.CA app. 5B1.3(b) (2001).
' See United States v. Turner, 44 F.3d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Bortels, 962 F.2d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Shovrater, 933 F.2d 573,
575-76 (7th Cir. 1991); Fiore v. United States, 696 F.2d 205, 208 (2d Cir. 1982);
Owens v. Kelly, 681 F.2d 1362, 1366 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Tonroy, 605
F.2d 144, 150 (5th Cir. 1979); Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554, 556-57 (9th Cir.
1974).
" State v. Pieger, 692 A.2d 1273, 1277 (Conn. 1997); People v. Pickens, 542
N.E.2d 1253, 1256-57 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
' See infra notes 129-131.
" See State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410, 411 (S.C. 1985) (quoting 24 C.J.S. Criminal
Law § 1618 (8) (1961) (judges "are allowed a wide, but not unlimited, discretion in
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both state statutory and case law to require that probation con-
ditions serve the purpose of offender rehabilitation.' 2 In addi-
tion, courts have repeatedly emphasized that while sentencing
judges have discretion to impose conditions of probation, their
discretion is not without limit. Whether the condition is rea-
sonable and appropriate is determined by how well it rehabili-
tates an offender while protecting the state from dangerous
offenders.5 0
In United States v. Consuleo-Gonzalez, the Ninth Circuit articu-
lated a three-part test to determine whether a condition impli-
cating a constitutional right bears a "reasonable relationship" to
the purposes of the federal probation statute. 3' First, the condi-
tion must serve the purposes of probation. Second, the court
must consider the extent to which probationers should enjoy
full constitutional rights. Third, the court must take into ac-
count the legitimate needs of law enforcement.32 More recently,
in United States v. Terrigno, the Ninth Circuit opined that the
"twin goals of probation" are "rehabilitation and protection of
the public."13 3 The Eighth Circuit subsequently agreed with the
Ninth Circuit. In United States v. Schoenrock, Eighth Circuit de-
clared that, even where preferred rights are affected, the test for
validity of probation conditions is "whether the conditions are
primarily designed to meet the ends of rehabilitation and pro-
tection of the public."34
The Alaska Appellate Court also emphasized the rehabilita-
tive goal of probation in striking down a condition of probation
requiring the defendant to obtain written court permission be-
imposing conditions of suspension of sentence or probation and they cannot impose
conditions that are illegal and void as against public policy")); People v. Keller, 76
Cal. App. 3d 827 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (court's discretion to impose conditions of
probation as granted by statute is circumscribed not only by terms of statute, but by
constitutional safeguards); supra notes 34 and 35.
See Fi.A STAT. ch. 921.187(1) (1997); Grubbs v. State, 373 So. 2d 905, 909 (Fla.
1979) (a condition of probation "must be reasonably related to the offense commit-
ted" and provide a standard of conduct essential to the rehabilitation of the of-
fender).
" See State v. Beiersdorf, 561 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. CL App. 1997); State v. Berrocales,
681 A.2d 95 (N.H. 1996).
13' United States v. Consuleo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 262 (9th. Cir. 1975).
132 See id.
"-'838 F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir. 1988).
'" United States v. Schoenrock, 868 F.2d 289, 291 (8th Cir. 1989) (quoting United
States v. Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir. 1988).
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fore entering the village where the offense occurred.'- The
court reasoned that such a condition was unnecessarily severe
and restrictive because it bore no reasonable relationship to the
offender's rehabilitation. ' More recently, the Supreme Court
of Arkansas confirmed that the underlying purpose of proba-
tion was the rehabilitation of the offender3 7 Invalidating a
condition of probation banishing the defendant from the state,
the court found the condition "repugnant to the underlying
policy of the probation law, which is to rehabilitate offenders
without compromising public safety."'
Thus, both history and contemporary case law establishes
rehabilitation as the purpose of probation. Yet, those who seek
to defend the validity of anti-prostitution zones fail to invoke
rehabilitation as a legitimate purpose of such zones. Prostitutes
allegedly threaten the "family-friendly" environment in Miami.'
South Beach designated a hooker-free zone in an effort to keep
prostitutes away from "the district known for its ritzy hotels and
nightclubs." Sarasota business owners lament that it is "a hor-
rible bother [to have] prostitutes... on my corner.""' In Dania
Beach, officials claim prostitutes' presence "discourages busi-
nesses from locating on the Federal Highway."' 42 One citizen
declared, "I don't care if you send them to another state-as
long as we don't have them." Miami residents say anti-
prostitution zones are "good if it's the only way we can get rid of
[prostitutes] . The "Not In My Backyard" attitude of Floridi-
ans ignores the rehabilitative ideal conditions of probation must
embody. Both Florida citizens and courts brush aside concern
for offenders' individual constitutional rights.
As one court has noted:
[Tihe value to the public [of ridding itself of offenders] does not mani-
festly outweigh any impairment of [offender's] constitutional rights of
freedom of travel, speech, [and] association . . . . Simply causing [of-
"5 SeeEdison v. State, 709 P.2d 510 (1985).
'35 See id. at 512.
IS SeeReeves v. State of Arkansas, 5 S.W.3d 41 (Ark. 1999).
s Id. at 45 (quoting State v. Young, 154 N.W.2d 699, 702 (Minn. 1967)).
39 See Meek, supra note 7.
140 Ia
14 See Spalding, supra note 6.
' SeeMonnay, supra note 1.
1' See Meek, supra note 7.
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fender] to move from one geographical location to another is of mini-
mal value to the public when compared with the infringement of [of-
fender's] basic constitutional rights.'"
While the public may champion the imposition of probation
conditions requiring prostitution offenders to stay away from
their neighborhoods, or away from "ritzy hotels," this require-
ment does nothing to further the rehabilitation of the offender
herself.
As discussed above, keeping prostitutes out of a specified
area achieves the goal of relocation, not rehabilitation. Women
carry with them wherever they go the means to commit the
crime of prostitution. It is paternalistic to suggest that the ad-
monition of a judge to "Stay away!" will foster the rehabilitation
of women engaged in the sale of sex. A discussion of the myriad
paths that lead women to sell their bodies is beyond the scope
of this article. It is well established, however, that for some, it is
a path characterized by oppression and abuse. 5 For others, it is
a conscious choice, believed by some to be an act of
empowerment. 4 6 In either case, the effectiveness of rehabilita-
tion may be questionable. But uncertainty regarding the proper
means of rehabilitation does not relieve courts from making an
effort. Rehabilitation reigns as the longstanding goal of proba-
tion, and anti-prostitution zones fall to promote that goal.
III. CHALLENGING SARASOTA'S PROSTITUTION-EXCLUSION ZONE:
DIETZ V. STATE OF FLORIDA
In support of the proposition that courts have revealed a
disconcerting penchant to redefine visibly punitive probation
conditions as rehabilitative, simply because their state statute al-
lows the imposition of rehabilitative conditions but does not al-
low punitive conditions, 4 7 one student Commentator offers the
Florida case of Villey v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission.1
4
In Villery, the Florida Supreme Court declared that a probation
condition served the interests of both retribution and rehabili-
... People v. Beach, 147 Cal. App. 3d 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
"' See generally CATHERINE A. MAcKiNNON, FEMmISM UNMODIFIED 5 (1987) (arguing
that economic reality, physical force, and sexual abuse leads women into prostitu-
tion).
" SeeAlmodovar, supra note 113.
117 See Brilliant, supra note 65, at 1372.
"' Villery v. Florida Parole and Probation Comm'n, 396 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1980).
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tation."9 Characterization of a punitive condition as rehabilita-
tive in order to stay within the contours of the probation statute,
however, does not make it so.
Last year, another Florida court made a similar attempt to
redefine a punitive probation condition as rehabilitative. In
2000, the Florida Court of Appeals affirmed prostitute Lisa Ann
Dietz's banishment from Sarasota's "Prostitution Exclusion
Zone." 50 On appeal, Dietz raised several points. First, she chal-
lenged the reasonableness of the probation condition as it re-
lated to the rehabilitative purpose of probation. Second, she
maintained that the conditions violated her individual constitu-
tional rights.
Writing for Florida's Twelfth Judicial Circuit, Judge Dakan
dismissed Dietz's first argument. While he conceded that Dietz
was fundamentally correct in her assertions regarding the reha-
bilitative goal of probation,'5 ' he ruled that rehabilitation and
punishment are not mutually exclusive ideas. 152 It was hard to
imagine, Judge Dakan contended, a condition of probation de-
void of some punitive aspect.
53
Purporting to employ a reasonable relation test, Judge Da-
kan concluded that the 'Prostitution Exclusion Zone' condition
was reasonably related to both rehabilitation and the deterrence
of future criminal conduct."M Judge Dakan did nothing more
than assert his conclusion without providing any meaningful
analysis. He went on to write that the record supported the ex-
istence of such a rational relationship between the exclusion
zone and the deterrence of future criminality.'o Again, how-
ever, he failed to reveal how the record supported the inference
of such a reasonable relationship. Judge Dakan blatantly ig-
nored his own presumption-that probation's fundamental
purpose is to rehabilitate offenders. In doing do, he nullified
the usefulness of the reasonable relationship test, as well. The
test itself concerns the relationship between the means and the
"9 See id. at 1110.
' Dietz v. State of Florida, No. 99-0566-CA-01, slip op. 1, 3 (Fla. L Weekly Supp.
Dec. 3, 1999).
... Id. at slip op. 2.
.52 Id at slip op. 2 (citing Lindsay v. State, 606 So. 2d 652, 656 (Fla. 4th DCA
1992)).





end. Judge Dakan himself conceded that where probation is
concerned, rehabilitation is the end. At issue in Lisa Ann
Dietz's case were the means - Prostitution Exclusion Zones. De-
spite concluding that the "Prostitution Exclusion Zone" was rea-
sonably related to both deterrence and rehabilitation, '5 6 Judge
Dakan utterly failed to demonstrate the existence of that rela-
tionship.
Judge Dakan next responded to Dietz's constitutional chal-
lenges. In holding that the exclusion was not overly broad to
accomplish the goal of rehabilitation,5 7 the court cited a single
case, Martinez v. State.58 The court's reliance upon that case is
misplaced. The Martinez court found invalid a probationary
condition that required an offender to remain outside the
United States for the duration of his probation.' As discussed
in Part II of this Comment, such a form of banishment has been
uniformly struck down as impermnissible. '60 Clearly, a condition
barring Dietz from the "Prostitution Exclusion Zone" does not
overreach to the same extent as one compelling emigration. In
addition, no justification was provided in support of the under-
lying assumption that the condition imposed upon Dietz was
narrowly tailored.
Finally, Judge Dakan analogized the case before him to
United States v. Cothran.6' He declared the two cases "remarkably
similar,' 62 despite the fact that Cothran involved a drug dealer
and Dietz a prostitute. In Cothran, the Eleventh Circuit acknowl-
edged that conditions of probation must fulfill the goal of reha-
bilitation16 by the measure of a reasonable relationship test. '"Utilizing that test, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the validity of a
156 See id
117 See id. Apparently, rehabilitation was restored its "goal" status in the second half
of the opinion; however, there is still no mention of how anti-prostitution zones actu-
ally foster such a goal.
58 See Martinez v. State, 627 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).
1 See id.
,"o See supra note 84.
16, 855 F.2d 749 (11th Cir. 1988).
,12 Dietz v. State of Florida, No. 99-0566-CA-01, slip op. 1, 2 (Fla. L. Weekly Supp.
Dec. 3, 1999).
1'6 Cothran, 855 F.2d at 751; see also Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1367 (11 th Cir.
1982) ("[Ljimitations are permitted because probationers have been convicted of
crimes and have thereby given the state a compelling interest in limiting their liberty
in order to effectuate their rehabilitation and to protect society.")
'" Cothran, 855 F.2d at 751 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (2001)).
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probation requirement barring Mr. Cothran from Fulton
County, Georgia, for the duration of his probation. ' G Co-
thran's temporary exclusion from Fulton County was reasonably
related to the purpose of probation, the court reasoned, be-
cause the exclusion would be combined with his mandatory
residence at a distant community treatment center. The court
argued that coupling such conditions afforded the defendant a
"unique opportunity to start anew and break free" of the envi-
ronment and influences that first led him to pander drugs.'6
In Lisa Ann Dietz's case, there was no mandatory residence
at a treatment center where, like Mr. Cothran, she would un-
dergo actual physical rehabilitation. In Dietz's case, there was
no "unique opportunity to start anew and break free of the en-
vironment and the familiar influences" which encouraged her
to prostitute in the first glace. 67 Often, it is a pimp, or a desper-
ate economic situation, that leads women to prostitution-
banishing them does nothing to remedy those circumstances. In-
deed, Lisa Ann Dietz actually told the court that she uses her
body for the sole purpose of supporting her crack cocaine
habit,'i a fact disregarded by Judge Dakan. Instead, he upheld
a condition barring Lisa Ann Dietz from an area of the city
where myriad social services and rehabilitative facilities are lo-
cated. In affirming the condition of probation barring Dietz
from the "Prostitution Exclusion Zone," the court failed to am-
ply address Dietz's challenges, failed to fulfill the rehabilitative
ideal embodied by probation and failed Ms. Dietz herself.
IV. REHABILITATION DEMANDS A REVISION OF VALUES AND THE
REALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
Both historical inquiry and statutory language reveal that
the purpose of probation is to rehabilitate the offender'a
Likewise, sound public policy demands that conditions of pro-
bation serve a rehabilitative purpose. Prostitution Exclusion
Zones like those implemented locally in Florida demonstrate a
' See id. at 752.
167 d
163 See FtowmS, supra note 105.
169 See Jose Luis Jimenez, Woman Chauenges Pwrtitution Zoan SARASOTA HERALI>
TRmUNE, Dec. 16, 1998, at lB.
' See COHEN, supra note 19, § 7:3, at 7-6; supra note 129.
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complete lack of commitment to the rehabilitative ideal. In-
stead, they expose allegiance to a system that criminalizes the
exchange of sex for money. That dedication necessarily pro-
motes a retributive justice over a rehabilitative ideal in dealing
with prostitutes.
Florida is not alone in its commitment, either. As it stands,
the United States continues to devote substantial public re-
sources to the application of criminal sanctions to those who of-
fer sex for money.' State governments spend millions of
dollars and thousands of hours attempting to curb prostitu-
tion.'7 2 One study estimates that in 1985, America's largest cities
each spent approximately twelve million dollars in their at-
tempts to enforce prostitution laws; this was considered to be an
underestimate. 7 3 Half of these cities spent more on enforce-
ment than they did on education or public welfare, and five
spent more than on hospitals and health care combined.
Along with the countless hours and dollars spent, the creation
and implementation of anti-prostitution zones reveals a society
dedicated to ridding itself of, or at least displacing, prostitutes.
One Dania beach official even describes the use of the exclusion
zones as "another weapon in the cities' anti-prostitution arse-
nal. ,, 75
Feminist legal scholars have taken the lead in challenging
the need for an "anti-prostitution arsenal" and in examining the
myriad attitudes Americans have toward prostitution. Prostitu-
tion is both a difficult and divisive issue for feminists. 7 , Some
champion legalization and the accompanying regulation,
177
while others vehemently oppose a step that serves to lend sup-
port to the commercial sex trade.'7 8 Whether in favor of legali-
zation or not, however, the vast majority of feminist scholars do
17, SeeJulie Pearl, The Highest Paying Customers: America's Cities and the Cost of Prostitu-
tion Contro 38 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 769-70 (1987).
'7' See Rhode, supra note 106, at A22.
,-' Street Cleaning: AIDS has Strengthened the Case for Legalised Brothels, ECONOMIST,
Sept. 7, 1991, at 28-29.
, INE VANWESENBEECK, PROSTITUTES' WELL-BEING AND RISK 2, 3 (1994).
171 See Monnay, supra note 1.
171 See Sylvia A. Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond Decriminalization, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 523,
534 (2000).
" See generally Almodovar, supra note 113.
171 See generally KATHLEEN BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY 107 (1979) (arguing pros-
titution promotes abuse and must remain illegal).
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agree that the criminalization of prostitution serves no legiti-
mate purpose.1' Despite the consensus among feminist legal
scholars, communities like those in Florida are determined to
employ liberty-restricting measures to combat prostitution
rather then invest in rehabilitation.'6° If we are to ignore the
feminist voice and remain a society committed to criminaliza-
tion, then we also must remain committed to offender rehabili-
tation. The extraordinary amount of resources communities
pour into superior law enforcement not only subverts the femi-
nist goal of decriminalization but the overarching rehabilitative
goal of probation, as well.
V. CONCLUSION
Abolishing probation conditions that restrict a convicted
prostitute's geographic mobility is warranted. Such conditions
ignore the rehabilitative ideal historically embodied by proba-
tion.'1 Likewise, they disregard the multitude of statutory and
case law directives mandating recognition of rehabilitation as
the primary purpose of probation. w The zones violate individ-
ual constitutional rights by preventing convicted offenders'
freedom of association.l" Moreover, anti-prostitution zones are
not reasonably related to the purpose of probation.' As im-
plemented in Florida, conditions of probation barring offenders
from exclusion zones facilitate relocation, not rehabilitation.
Judge Dakan's inadequate opinion affirming the imposition
of an anti-prostitution zone in Sarasota reveals a failure to con-
sider the aforementioned issues.' s Despite acknowledging that
the fundamental purpose of probation is rehabilitation, Judge
Dakan embraced a punitive condition of probation especially
inappropriate for an offender convicted of prostitution. s The
implementation of anti-prostitution zones and the Florida
court's decision to uphold such zones in the face of constitu-
"'SeeDeCou, supra note 112.
" See Spalding, supra note 6.
"' See COHEN, supra note 19, § 7:3, at 7-6.
'
82 See supra notes 68, 69.
"'See supra notes 98-100.
See supra notes 124-26, 129.





tional challenges reveals a society committed not to rehabilita-
tion, but to punishment.1 17 The incredible amount of resources
targeted at enforcing prostitution laws must be reallocated to
rehabilitate offenders. Since its inception, probation has em-
bodied the rehabilitative ideal."" To serve that ideal and to pro-
tect offenders' individual constitutional rights, anti-prostitution
zones must be abolished.
287 See supra notes 171-75.
. See supra note 181.
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